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We cannot fully understand and improve global governance without
understanding the process of negotiation in international organizations
and other regimes. The strategies and tactics used by governments and
official mediators partly determine whether negotiations end in impasse or
agreement as well as the terms of agreements reached. A contrast between
the World Trade Organization’s negotiations in two recent cases, in 1999
and 2001, illustrates how variations in the negotiation process can shape
regime rules, their evolution through time, and their legitimacy. This
contrast reveals gaps in current regime literature and suggests five
hypotheses for investigation in other regimes.MAKING AND BREAKING IMPASSES IN INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES: THE WTO, SEATTLE AND DOHA
We cannot fully understand and improve global governance unless we
understand the process of negotiation in international organizations and
other regimes. A contrast between two recent negotiations in the World
Trade Organization (WTO) strongly suggests how the negotiation process
shapes regime rules, their evolution through time, their effectiveness, and
their legitimacy.  This contrast reveals gaps in current regime literature and
suggests five hypotheses that could be investigated in other regimes.     
International organizations and other regimes are evolving, living
things, as William Zartman has put it.
1 They are not fixed objects with
which states simply comply or not.  Members have a third option; they can
also try to improve the regime. Efforts toward institutional change are
frequent and they almost always involve negotiation.
Most regime negotiations involve distributive struggle and impasses,
which is not surprising considering the great differences among the
world’s countries, as well as the disproportionate influence of special
interests in all countries and distrust lingering from historical experience.
Thus a regime cannot be created or modified unless the parties can break
their deadlocks. How negotiators and mediators make and break impasses
is one of the most crucial questions for all who care about international
institutions.
The process is not the only thing that makes a difference. The
surrounding structures and material conditions create incentives and
boundaries that shape actors’ behavior and may even help constitute
identities. And if players operated with complete information and crisp
classical rationality, negotiations might not be needed at all.  But the fact
that governments and nonstate actors spend billions of dollars every year
preparing for, influencing, and conducting negotiations is a clue that this
theoretical assumption might be misleading. This paper assumes real
players operate with bounded rationality, which creates space in which the
process makes its difference. The behavior of other negotiators and
mediators influences how governments perceive their options and what is
feasible. They lack crisp a priori reservation values; their subjective
resistance points are fuzzy and partly endogenous to the process, up to
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some limit given by structures.  This paper will provide evidence that even
the strongest structures of power and rules leave substantial leeway for
negotiators and mediators to shape their collective course of action
according to their beliefs and choices among multiple equilibria.
The diverse evolutionary paths we observe remain somewhat
mysterious to today’s regime theory. The paper’s first section briefly
identifies some gaps in what regime scholarship has had to say about the
negotiation process. The second and third sections present a retrospective
contrast of two recent attempts at regime change, showing how parties get
into and out of impasse and how the negotiation process can shape regime
evolution and legitimacy. The two cases—the WTO’s talks in 1999 and
2001 ending in Seattle, USA, and Doha, Qatar, respectively--were selected
primarily to provide a contrast on the dependent variable, impasse versus
agreement. The paper, then, has three purposes: to explain some significant
recent events, to illustrate how existing ideas from negotiation analysis
may be applied in regime studies, and to generate new hypotheses for
further investigation. The purpose is not to test hypotheses or prove
causality in these cases definitively.
What We Know about the Regime Negotiation Process
The international negotiation process means what government negotiators
do in their interactions with one another and with markets, constituents,
nonstate actors, and mediators. The theoretical study of international
institutions and the empirical study of international negotiation long
remained largely isolated from one other on separate tracks.
2 Although this
has been changing and we now have solid empirical knowledge about a
few regime negotiations, many regime theories and case studies still give
only partial glimpses of the negotiation process. Many lack a conception of
that process as a whole, which determines the significance of each part.
3
International regime cooperation studies have achieved much and continue
                                                                
2Major exceptions include Winham 1986 on the GATT, Zartman 1987 on UNCTAD, Moravcsik
1998 on the European Union, and Sebenius 1984, Susskind 1994, Young 1989, 1991, 1994, and
Friedheim 1993 on United Nations environmental bargaining.  The latter also cites the literature on UN
parliamentary diplomacy (p. 373).  Zartman 1994 introduces six analytical approaches to multilateral
negotiation.  This section concentrates on scholarship most relevant for international economic
organizations.  Negotiation analysis in general is also developed in such journals as Group Decision and
Negotiation, International Negotiation, and Negotiation Journal.
3Attempting to present a full conception of the process here would make this paper unwieldy.
See comprehensive classics such as Walton and McKersie 1965, Raiffa 1982 and Zartman and Berman
1982.  Odell 2000 presents a recent synthesis with special features for economic negotiations.                                                                                                                                                             3
to deepen and expand,
4  but both rationalist and constructivist approaches
leave substantial gaps.
Research during the 1980s concentrated on why regimes are formed
and whether they influence state behavior, emphasizing important features
other than the negotiation process. Many empirical investigations paid
little attention to what negotiators do and did not try to generalize about
this process, even though researchers defined cooperation as involving
negotiation
5 and most selected cases where cooperation resulted from
explicit bargaining. Many theorists still assume state preferences are fixed
prior to negotiation by background conditions such as the international
power structure, globalization or domestic politics, and many prefer to use
preferences to explain outcomes without observing what negotiators do in
the interim. Many regime analysts have assumed that negotiators’ and
mediators’ behaviors follow their theories’ expectations, and have
provided only thin evidence or none at all about what negotiating strategies
the diplomats used and what difference they made.
6
An exception was Keohane and Nye 1977 and other works that
called attention to the tactic of issue linkage, one facet of this process. One
hypothesis holds that negotiating under the umbrella of a common
international institution should make issue linkages more likely, implying
that this will also make cooperation for mutual gain more likely.
7 Actually
issue linkage is ubiquitous in international negotiations.  Most instances
inside and outside regimes involve more than one issue and the typical
agreement links them together in a package deal.  But nothing in current
regime theory tells us which issues should or will be linked, nor whether
linkage attempts will succeed or fail.
8  Attempting to link a certain issue to
a package can also block an agreement that would be reached otherwise, if
the issue is a divisive one on which the parties lack a positive zone of
agreement.  Yet subtracting this issue may disappoint members for whom
it is the top priority.  Deciding which issues are added and subtracted in
                                                                
4 These achievements and remaining challenges are detailed well by Haggard and Simmons 1987,
Milner 1992, Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997, and Martin and Simmons 1998.
5 See definitions in Keohane 1984, 51-52, and Milner 1992.
6 E.g., Keohane 1984; Webb 1991, Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1992, Simmons 1994, Weber 1994,
Suzuki 1994, Iida 1995, Raustiala 1997, Oatley and Nabors 1998, and Remmer 1998.  Greater evidence
about the external negotiation process can be found in Putnam and Bayne 1987, Jönsson 1987, Iida 1993 and
Milner 1997.  Sebenius 1992 and Fearon 1998 have made related points.
7
8 In fact, the most widely-known application of the notion of linkage—US Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger’s effort to link Soviet restraint in developing countries to US concessions in arms
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which order is a major feature of the negotiation process,
9 yet regime
theory so far has had little to say about how this is done.
Many analysts have used the lens of game theory to view
bargaining, including that in regimes.  A prominent class of mathematical
models explores another facet of the negotiation process by representing
rational players with incomplete information who signal and change
beliefs during bargaining.
10 This enterprise has made considerable progress
over the past two decades. Yet all tractable models depend on severe
simplifying assumptions, such that changing one can upset the
conclusions. Virtually all international relations models assume optimizing
behavior, despite extensive evidence showing that actual negotiators
operate with only bounded rationality in the sense of less taxing decision
rules.
11  Most models assume an extremely simple set of strategy options
and omit most of what negotiators and mediators do. In these models
“information” has a restricted meaning that so far omits most of the beliefs
and biases that seem to affect actual negotiators. Many game theoretic
articles present little or no evidence, leaving us unclear whether the real
world follows the theory.  Few game theoretic models have concentrated
on international economic organizations’ negotiations.
12
Many of us have put certain ideas from game theory to work
informally.  Some have used the analogy of the Prisoners’ dilemma to
suggest a rational reason for states to cooperate at all through institutions.
Schelling 1960 and later Williamson 1985 called attention to the credibility
of threats and promises.  Commitment credibility is another facet of the
process.  In the 1990s this insight was applied to the European Union and
other international regimes,
  13 though more often to bargaining outside
regimes. Most regime theory is silent about how negotiators make
commitments more or less credible. There is evidence that the tactics they
use make some commitments more credible than others.
14
A focal point is another aspect of some negotiations. Garrett and
Weingast 1993 apply Schelling’s notion to suggest that an international
court or secretariat can supply an idea for an agreement as a focal point
                                                                
9 Sebenius
10 As illustrations, Iida 1993, Fearon 1994, Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow and Zorick 1997, and
many earlier works cited there. Also see Young 1975.
11 Odell 2002b.
12 Exceptions include Martin 1992, Milner with Rosendorff 1997.
13 Martin 1992; Cowhey 1993; Odell 1993; Moravcsik 1998; Martin 2000.
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solution that the states might not find otherwise. Other players and
mediators in multilateral negotiations also advance proposals designed to
attract a consensus.  But some efforts fail and some even impede
agreement. We know little about which tactics are more and less effective
in creating a focal point under what conditions, in regime or other
negotiations.
Putnam’s (1988) metaphor of the two-level game, representing
interactions between negotiators and domestic politics, captures another
major slice of the process.  Formal modelers have begun to model two-
level games
15 and considerable empirical research has illuminated this
angle as well.
16 Still, a surprising number of these studies shy away from
describing and analyzing what international negotiators do with one
another.
Risse (2000) concentrates on one significant part of what they do -
communication, argumentation and persuasion. This constructivist
perspective too has potential to enrich our understanding, but it too
disregards the rest of negotiation theory that situates persuasion in its
place. Risse formulates “argumentation” and “bargaining” as alternatives.
In practice bargaining never takes place without persuasive attempts.
In the 1990s other scholars advanced our understanding of states’
compliance and noncompliance with their international agreements (see
the excellent review in Simmons 1998). Yet most of the theoretical ideas
brought to bear so far remain static, pointing to attributes visible prior to
the behavior, such as transaction costs, administrative incapacity to
comply, democratic versus authoritarian domestic institutions, and
international norms. Most compliance studies overlook the fact that the
degree and form of international compliance often results from a post-
agreement negotiation.
17 For example, most states that are charged with
violating the rules of the World Trade Organization settle their disputes
through negotiation with their complainants before the legal proceedings
have run their full course.
18 Even after a party has lost unambiguously in
the legal forum, the form of compliance may still be negotiated, as it was
with Europe in the celebrated bananas case. And virtually all other
international organizations are less judicialized than the WTO, allowing
                                                                
15 Mo 1994, Mo 1995, Milner and Rosendorff 1997 and other works in the same issue.
16 Illustrations relevant for international regimes include Goldstein 1996, Wolf and Zangl 1996,
Milner 1997, Raustiala 1997, Goldstein and Martin 2000.
17 Jönsson and Tallberg 1998, Zartman forthcoming.
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greater leeway for compliance negotiations. We know little about what
happens in these talks and how they influence the compliance outcomes.
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001 offer an original set of
hypotheses to explain why different international institutions have different
structural features. This offering too is interesting and promising as far as
it goes, but these new hypotheses also neglect the negotiation process.
Two contrasting outcomes
To see more of what is added by focusing squarely on the negotiation
process, consider a sharp contrast between two recent negotiations within
the World Trade Organization. The WTO’s highest decision-making body
is a conference of trade ministers. In 1999 member states accounting for a
large majority of world trade said they wanted to go to Seattle on 30
November for their third ministerial conference to launch a new
multilateral round, another that would extend the sequence of eight large-
scale negotiations that had liberalized trade and elaborated international
rules since World War II.
19  Many proposals for the round’s agenda
foreshadowed significant regime change including more behind-the-border
regulation.
As everyone knows, American critics used Seattle to organize a
vocal campaign to protest globalization and the WTO, and the conference
ended in a dramatic impasse. On the first day union members,
environmentalists, consumer advocates, and students marching in three
columns converged on downtown Seattle chanting “No new round,
turnaround.”
20 Seattle police allowed protestors to penetrate the space
between the convention center and the hotels and block the negotiators
from even entering the hall for a day. Police threw tear gas into the tumult
and eventually called out the National Guard to restore order. Four days
later the ministers left Seattle without having agreed to launch a new
round. They failed even to issue a communiqué pledging to keep working
together. This meeting simply collapsed, with several cabinet ministers
                                                                
19Among those who wanted to launch a new round covering more than agriculture and services
were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, the European
Communities, Hong Kong-China, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Poland,
Romania, Singapore, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United States,
and Uruguay.  WTO Focus (Aug.-September 1998); International Trade Reporter (ITR) 25 November
1998, 1956; WTO General Council, minutes of special session, 7 July 1999.
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publicly condemning the organization and the United States for the way
they had been treated.
The stunning collapse left protestors jubilant,
21 hosts embarrassed,
and market participants confused.  Nor was this the organization’s first
serious impasse that year.  Earlier the members had polarized into a bitter
deadlock over the choice of a new Director-General. “The WTO’s
credibility is lower than it has ever been,” said  The Economist on 11
December. The organization’s legitimacy had clearly declined.
In November 2001 the same states sent negotiators to the fourth
WTO ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar, with a strikingly different
result. The ministers eventually broke their impasse.  They agreed on an
agenda to launch a new major round covering twelve complex issues, to
end in January 2005.  The package deal also included some side payments.
Major players--the United States, the European Union, Japan, Korea, the
Cairns group of agricultural exporters, African-Caribbean-Pacific
countries, and other developing countries--each managed to get something
they valued into the package.  This time no minister denounced the WTO
for excluding him or her from real decision-making. The organization’s
credibility and legitimacy had clearly improved.
22
How can we explain this sharp contrast in outcomes—an impasse
and an agreement--especially since several significant conditions were the
same?   The two cases involved the same organization and the same set of
states with essentially the same commercial interests.  In both cases the
negotiators faced the prospect of significant gains that could be achieved
through negotiation.  Gains could be collected by exchanging differently-
valued concessions on market access--lowering remaining mutual barriers
in the form of tariffs on industrial goods, tariffs and subsidies on
agricultural goods, and barriers to services trade. Other exchanges
regarding aspects of the common rules were also conceivable. In short, the
problem at Seattle was not that the parties’ trade interests clearly ruled out
any agenda that could have made all countries better off. In January 1999 it
was not obvious that Seattle was going to be a train wreck.  In fact, the
                                                                
21Los Angeles Times, 5 December 1999, A18; New York Times, 5 Decemeber 1999, 14.
22 The first headline from Doha was that the People’s Republic of China and Chinese Taipei
became WTO members at this conference.  These, however, were results of different multilateral
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Indian delegation, the leading opponent of a new round, believed at that
time that the boosters would succeed.
23
Furthermore, several other conditions that were impediments to
agreement in Seattle were equally unfavorable two years later. Political
demand for a new round from organized business (beyond agriculture and
services issues, on which the parties had already agreed to begin
discussions) was relatively weak in both cases--weaker for instance than in
1986 when GATT states agreed in Uruguay to launch the last round.
24
Second, the negotiators were operating under the same regime rules and
decision-making procedures. Multilateral negotiations in the GATT and
WTO, unlike most international organizations, lead to binding legal
obligations. And in the WTO, unlike the GATT, an adverse ruling in a
formal dispute becomes binding automatically unless overturned by
consensus.  Negotiators knew that reneging on a new commitment would
have greater cost than before; thus it stands to reason that all would be
more cautious about accepting any new commitment.  But this was still
true in 2001.
25 Likewise, the WTO decision rule is consensus, which gives
the smallest member the authority to block action by the whole. This had
been the convention under GATT as well, but in those days few
developing countries were active in these negotiations.  After 1998, many
more developing countries became far more active, as more adopted pro-
trade development policies, their new WTO commitments began to have
serious costs at home, and yet for many, export gains were not
materializing. For instance, even the least-developed African states
engaged in serious joint training and caucusing before Seattle and put
forward joint technical proposals on issues of concern to them.  Managing
the WTO toward a consensus was now much more complicated. Yet
neither the consensus requirement nor the complexity was any easier in
2001.
We cannot explain why these two cases turned out differently or the
terms of the Doha deal without understanding two key changes—in
exogenous political conditions and in the negotiation process. In the first
category are the fact that Seattle had been an embarrassment and the 11
September 2001 attacks in the United States. In hindsight it appears that by
November 2001 key negotiators had decided that these events had
                                                                
23Interview with an Indian negotiator, Geneva, June 2000.  All interviewees spoke on condition
of anonymity.
24 World Trade Agenda [WTA], 26 March 2001, 3.
25 As evidence of this caution see Y. Tandon, “LDCs Reject a New Round for Doha,” 24 July
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increased the perceived cost of impasse in Doha. This perceived worsening
in the alternative to agreement lowered member states’ fuzzy reservation
values somewhat and probably widened a zone of agreement between
them. As for the rest of the process, two partly independent dimensions
should be distinguished: the member states’ strategies and the strategies
used by WTO mediator-managers. The largest traders, the European Union
and the United States, shifted their strategies from what I call the strict
distributive strategy to more mixed strategies, especially in the final days.
This induced smaller parties to show some flexibility in response. In
addition, tactics used in 2001 by WTO manager-mediators during
preparations in Geneva and at the ministerial conference in Doha were less
exclusionary and inflammatory, and in another respect bolder and less
counterproductive for that reason, than those used two years earlier.
Both types of shift—in exogenous political conditions and
behavioral strategy--were necessary to produce the particular deal reached.
Boundedly rational negotiators in the fog of battle can never know with
certainty whether they face a positive zone of agreement. Each government
has strong incentives to distort information about its true minimum.
Furthermore, each negotiator brings biased perceptions and is uncertain
about how much can be gained. At the outset most negotiators have only
fuzzy perceptions of their own reservation values on many issues, which
makes these values subject to framing by the process. This is especially so
when he or she is faced with 140 other parties and ten to fifteen highly
technical issues simultaneously, and when many member governments
lack the expertise needed to sort out the implications of all this complexity
by themselves. How others, including mediators and managers, behave
during the process critically shapes their perceptions and tips their tactical
decisions toward or away from impasse and particular terms of settlement.
This pair of cases illustrates vividly how the negotiation process can push
parties apart or pull them together, influencing regime evolution and





One reason for the 1999 impasse was that the parties’ negotiating
strategies leaned heavily toward the distributive—that is, behavior
functional for claiming value from others—rather than the integrative—
behavior functional for deals that create mutual gains. Integrative tactics
include relatively open exploration of common problems; proposing a
formula, such as a tariff cutting formula, that would create value for many
parties; proposing exchanges of concessions that might benefit more than
one party; and reframing the issues themselves in ways that ease impasses
and create joint gains.
To simplify, many negotiators in 1999 opened with lists of demands
for others to concede while rejecting the others’ highest priorities, and then
stuck to these one-sided positions right down to the final hours in Seattle.
India’s strategy, for example, was strictly distributive vis-à-vis the
developed countries. India led in framing what came to be called the
implementation issue. While gathering support among the Like Minded
coalition of ten other developing countries, India generated a number of
proposals designed to shift value from the rich to the poor states and delay
or obstruct the launching of a new round. The central argument was that
the 1994 Uruguay round agreements, as developed countries had
implemented them, were profoundly unfair to the developing members.
The poor had made substantial commitments to open their markets and
take other steps, in the expectation of gaining increased market access for
their exports especially in agriculture and textiles and clothing. The rich
countries had failed to implement valuable market openings in both areas.
Vague provisions promising special, differential treatment in favor of
developing countries had not been implemented concretely. Furthermore,
India and its colleagues argued, certain developed countries have been
using antidumping measures to harass exporters, and have been using
dispute settlement to attack legitimate developing country policies.
Subsidies normally used by developed countries are considered non-
                                                                
26 The Seattle section of this paper draws upon Odell 2002a.
27By “strategy” I mean a set of behaviors that are observable in principle and associated with a
plan to achieve some objective through bargaining.  Thus this behavioral concept has a different meaning
from “strategy” in typical game theory.  Tactics are particular actions that make up a strategy.  Odell
2000 presents a comprehensive strategy typology.  A strategy on the distributive end of the spectrum is a
set of actions that promote the attainment of one party’s goals when they are in conflict with those of the
other parties.  A strategy on the purely integrative end is a set of actions that promote the attainment of
goals that are not in fundamental conflict, actions that expand rather than split the pie.  Tactical elements
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actionable under these rules, while subsidies usually used by developing
countries are actionable.
28 India proposed specific developed country
concessions in the rules on subsidies, antidumping, sanitary, and
investment measures, and promised virtually no negotiating gain to the
developed countries.
29
Implementation turned out to have more than one meaning. The
second meaning was the point that developing countries were having
difficulty setting up institutions and training officials as required to live up
to some of their own commitments.
The fifteen-nation Cairns group
30 of agricultural exporters also
adopted an ambitious distributive strategy, demanding one-way
concessions from those who protect and subsidize farming. Cairns insisted
on nailing down substantial gains in the agenda itself, before the
negotiation proper had even begun. The group wanted the EU and Japan to
commit not only to further liberalize agriculture substantially—which the
latter accepted—but also to finally bring agriculture under the same rules
as other goods trade by the end of this round. They demanded that one
negotiating goal must be the elimination of export subsidies. Meanwhile
Cairns members showed little enthusiasm for the EU’s priority proposals
on investment, competition policy, environment and labor.
Brussels was equally firm in refusing to eliminate agricultural export
subsidies and in demanding ambitious new behind-the-border issues. The
EU maintained that agreements on investment and competition policy
would each create mutual benefit in its own right. If so, the EU strategy
could be considered partially integrative. Many others, however, viewed
these new schemes as losses. Despite widespread opposition in North as
well as South, the EU held firm for these demands through the last day in
Seattle and beyond.
Japan also favored an ambitious round dealing with investment,
electronic commerce, antidumping, and other issues. A narrow approach
would be “too selfish” and therefore not viable, they said.
31 Issues beyond
                                                                
28Communication from India, Concerns regarding Implementation of Provisions relating to
Differential and More Favourable Treatment of Developing and Least-Developed Countries in Various
WTO Agreements, WTO Doc. WT/GC/2/108 (Nov. 13, 1998).
29 ITR, 9 June 1999, 967-968.
30Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Fiji, South Africa,
Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
31Statement by Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry in Seattle, reported in
Inside U.S. Trade [IUST], special report II, 3 December 1999, 3.                                                                                                                                                             12
agriculture and services are needed so that all countries can come away
with gains.  Japan so firmly rejected Cairns demands on agriculture in
October that its Geneva delegate refused to continue talking about it until
Seattle.
The United States mixed one major mutual-gains initiative with
prominent distributive tactics. The U.S. advocated fresh reciprocal
bargaining over market access in eight industrial sectors. Other elements of
the U.S. position were clearly distributive. Washington’s sectoral approach
excluded sectors of great interest to other members. In agriculture the U.S.,
like Cairns, mostly demanded one-way concessions from the EU, Japan,
and Korea. The U.S. opposed including competition policy and showed
little enthusiasm for an investment agreement.  The Clinton administration
parried implementation demands as well, replying that developing
countries’ problems with meeting agreed deadlines could be handled case-
by-case after a round began.  Washington flatly rejected renegotiating the
textile or antidumping agreements, high priorities for developing countries
and Japan.  The U.S. said countries should finish implementing the 1994
deals before any renegotiations began.
Other U.S. ideas that might have been intended as mutual-gain
possibilities looked to others like losses. Washington and Ottawa
continued to advocate making the WTO and its dispute settlement process
more transparent to public scrutiny and participation.
32 Most
controversially, the Clinton administration and the EU repeatedly urged the
WTO to devote greater attention to how countries treat their workers.
Beginning at the 1996 Singapore ministerial meeting, developing countries
had consistently reacted strongly against bringing labor rights into the
WTO. Yet belatedly on 1 November 1999, after it was too late to start
building a consensus even on an easy problem, Washington formally
proposed that ministers agree in Seattle to create a new Working Party on
Trade and Labor inside the WTO.  Its mandate would be limited to
studying the relationship between trade and employment, social
protections, and observation of core labor standards; examining the extent
of forced child labor in industries engaged in international trade; and
reporting their findings to the next ministerial conference. In sum, the U.S.
strategy, blocking so many issues favored by the EU, Japan, and
developing countries, gave other players little incentive to make
concessions to the US wish list.
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Thus the strategies of the two trade superpowers--the EU to some
extent and especially the United States--drove blocking coalitions together
and helped them maintain their unity, as well as clashing with each other
over the round’s broad scope. Meanwhile, many other governments
prepared many other submissions too numerous to recount. For example,
22 African members joined forces in submissions regarding the rules on
customs valuation and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS).
Mediation and political management
In some multilateral negotiations, parties begin with conflicting positions
but the process, often involving mediators, rearranges these positions into
acceptable agreements. A second problem in 1999 was that mediation and
political management tactics in Geneva and Seattle were also weaker and
less inclusive than in Doha, poorly coordinated, and even
counterproductive. The Geneva preparations got serious far too late. Even
then, two potential mediators were in weak positions to break an impasse.
Moreover, the chair of the WTO General Council used a technique that
perversely encouraged rigidity by the parties. The WTO’s mechanisms for
bridging differences prior to the ministerial conference failed to settle a
single one of the fifteen issues in play.
Later one WTO Ambassador recalled:
One of the main things that went wrong for Seattle was the
preparation.  And I was as guilty of this as anyone.  We
agreed that we were going to have a proposal-driven process.
We would all put forward all our ideas and then work it down
into some agreements.  So then [in October] we had this 30
page document full of multiple options on issues and square
brackets.  Then we in Geneva seemed incapable of refining it,
of seeing our piece go, of making compromises.
33
First, however, preparations for Seattle were delayed by a prolonged fight
over the choice of a successor to WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero,
who had announced he planned to retire on 30 April 1999.  Four initial
candidates were reduced effectively to two: Mr. Mike Moore, former
Trade Minister of New Zealand, and Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi,
                                                                
33 Interview, Geneva, 21 November 2002.  Many other Geneva participants have echoed these
points.                                                                                                                                                             14
Thailand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce Minister. As Ruggiero’s
departure approached, members lined up behind their first choices.  On 30
April, one of the chief mediators,  General Council Chair Ali Mchumo of
Tanzania, proposed Mike Moore as the candidate around whom consensus
could best be built. He reported that 62 delegations favored Moore while
59 favored Supachai. He said Moore had support from a wide geographical
range of members and faced less determined resistance from his
opponents.
34
Malaysia, speaking for Thailand and the other ASEAN states,
immediately objected to this proposal, declared that therefore no consensus
existed for Moore, and called for a vote. Malaysia had been claiming that
its candidate had initially won the support of 65 percent of the delegations
that had expressed a preference. Malaysia accused unnamed others,
evidently meaning the United States, of taking “subversive and divisive
actions” that undermined the system by exercising a secret veto,
preventing the chair from nominating Supachai until they could twist more
arms behind the scenes.  Kenya supported Malaysia and urged Mchumo to
try to form a consensus behind Supachai. Also endorsing Malaysia’s
position were Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Uganda,
Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Mexico, Haiti, and Cuba. Behind Moore were the
United States, Canada, most of Latin America, Nigeria, and Turkey.  The
EU states were split.  Diplomatic courtesies dropped away as ambassadors
attacked one another with remarkable charges of intellectual dishonesty,
irresponsibility, intimidation, disinformation, and assaults on others’
honor.
35  This long meeting finally recessed without a settlement and the
bitter deadlock continued for weeks.  At a 22 July meeting, Bangladesh
and Australia finally brokered a grudging compromise.  Moore and
Supachai would each be appointed to the post for a three-year term, Moore
first, with no possibility that either could be extended or reappointed. A
coalition of mostly developing countries had taken the WTO hostage and
had won something.
As a consequence of this fight, two potential mediators were in
unusually weak positions to take the lead. Between April and September
there was no permanent Director-General was in town at all.  Even when
he arrived, Moore spent a substantial share of his initial time visiting
developing country delegations and pledging fealty to their interests. He
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had no Deputy DGs in place until November. General Council chairman
Mchumo apparently lost the confidence of many delegations, for reasons
that may have been beyond his control.
36
The task in Geneva was to agree on as much as possible of a
ministerial declaration setting the agenda for a new round.  The drafting
phase finally got down to business only 8 weeks before the opening gavel
in Seattle.  The analogous phase in 1986 had taken more than 18 weeks.
The chair was faced with an unprecedented proliferation of proposals
indicating many complex differences to be narrowed.  On 7 October chair
Mchumo circulated a draft declaration on his own responsibility. It had
ministers agreeing to launch a new round. It listed most of the agenda
items advanced by parties, in relatively simple form except for agriculture
and services. The U.S. and others favored working from this draft, but the
EU and Japan rejected it as a basis for discussion. The draft’s section on
implementation also had not listed specific steps for immediate action in
Seattle. On 11 October Mchumo circulated a long addendum with many
highly specific demands for immediate action. This extensive language
implied extensive renegotiation of many Uruguay round agreements—in 8
weeks. U.S. negotiators and others regarded these as over the top—not
serious proposals but rather negotiating coin to be given up in return for
satisfaction on other issues, or an effort to clog the process in the hope of
blocking the launch of any round.
37
On 19 October Mchumo replaced this with an even more sprawling
33-page draft declaration, full of square brackets indicating disagreements.
It presented three alternative positions each on implementation and
services and four alternatives on agriculture.
38 The chair even accepted
provocative language that criticized members whose ministers would be
expected to sign it. In many cases he added language with which
governments were attempting to maneuver rivals not only into agreeing to
negotiate on an issue, but also into conceding a specific outcome via the
Seattle declaration itself. This document became a mere compilation of
opposed positions rather than a true single negotiating text designed to
express a possible consensus.
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One participant complained that “the October 1999 draft was a
backwards way to try to build a consensus.” The previous spring, the
Central European countries and the Swiss had recommended starting
simple, as in 1986, adding elements to the single text only after parties had
worked out compromises. The complaint was that once delegations see
their positions in the chair’s document, then the process amounts to
convincing parties to lose things, making it more difficult to achieve any
consensus.
39
Much of the time thereafter in Geneva was absorbed discussing
agriculture and implementation.
40 Parties took one another’s issues
hostage, an aggressive distributive tactic. Pakistan, India, Egypt, Malaysia,
Mexico, and others said they opposed negotiating new rules until they had
been satisfied on implementation of existing ones.
41 The Cairns group
refused to talk about any other issues until they had been satisfied on
agriculture. The EU insisted it could not show flexibility on agriculture
until others had agreed to negotiate over its priority items such as
investment. The U.S. refused to talk about negotiating over antidumping or
textiles under any circumstances. These same governments had committed
to launching a round in Seattle.
As in 1986, the Director-General and delegations made efforts
outside the General Council room where, with more than 100 delegations
at the table, it is virtually impossible to break impasses. Moore began
holding small informal meetings in his “green room,” a small conference
room in the executive suite. GATT Directors-General had established a
tradition of inviting representatives of no more than 30 members to this
room or to their homes.  The names of the nations invited are not made
public, but typically they include the Quad—the EU, the U.S., Canada and
Japan—and other members that account for the most trade, with some
variation depending on product or issue to be discussed. Most seats are
occupied by larger developing countries, especially as the EU has absorbed
more and more developed states.
42  But dozens of small traders were
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excluded entirely in 1999 and not informed what was happening inside.
Delegates inside the green room generally repeated the same
uncompromising positions they had been taking in the larger venue.
43 It
was becoming clear that Geneva was “full of developing country delegates
insisting that they are not going to be ‘rolled’ this time, as they believe
they were in the Uruguay round.”
44 Moore met bilaterally with many
delegations and asked former deputy director-general Anwarul Hoda of
India to meet privately with delegations to explore for a possible deal on
implementation.
45
The EU attempted to build a coalition without the U.S.  They began
with a “defensive alliance” of high-cost agricultural producers—Norway,
Switzerland, Japan and Korea. This group agreed to insist on agriculture
language referring to the “multifunctional” character of farming, a marker
they could cite later to justify maintaining support programs despite their
trade-distorting effects.
46  Then they “built outward,” as an EU negotiator
put it, talking to other interlocutors willing to work toward compromises.
47
The EU eventually gave the document to Moore, urging him to put it
forward as a chair’s text, but he declined.
48
The planned deadline for the Geneva phase was 5 November, but
not one major issue had been settled by then.  Moore called capitals again
to seek greater flexibility. Talks continued with some near breakthroughs
that then broke down. Moore considered circulating a simpler text on his
own responsibility, as Ruggiero had done prior to the 1996 Singapore
ministerial, but hesitated when some delegations objected.
49 Finally on 23
November Moore and Mchumo threw in the towel, pointing to remaining
gaps over agriculture and implementation above all.  After a year of work,
the best they could send to ministers was the 19 October hodgepodge that
no one thought was adequate for a ministerial conference.
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The management of Seattle threw up additional colorful obstacles to
agreement, strengthened the blocking coalition, and cut short the impasse-
breaking process before it could be completed. Three particular
management decisions stand out. Most obviously, the police failed to
prevent the demonstrators from taking control of the streets around the
conference hall.  As a result, some international visitors were tear-gassed
and they lost one of the four allotted days.
Second, as ministers finally began to negotiate on Wednesday, the
head of the host government gave a now-famous interview to a Seattle
newspaper.  After mentioning his proposal to create a WTO working group
to study labor issues, President Clinton volunteered, “Ultimately I would
favor a system in which sanctions would come for violating any provision
of a trade agreement.”
50 Clinton infuriated other countries and naturally
made it more difficult for any fence sitters to support the U.S. on labor.
“The worst thing in the process in Seattle,” observed a Southeast Asian
diplomat who was there, “was President Clinton’s statement. It hardened
the resolve of a lot of developing countries to resist. This statement was a
godsend to those who did not want a round.”
51 The president undermined
the future credibility of his own representatives, including the conference
chair, who had gone to great pains to deny that sanctioning other countries
was the purpose behind their proposal. Virtually everyone concluded that
Clinton’s top priority was not reaching agreement but helping the
Democratic party in the coming elections.
Third, U.S. minister Charlene Barshefsky decided to chair the
conference as well as hosting it. The conference chair is a potential
mediator and consensus builder. Past ministerials held in Montreal and
Brussels had been chaired by Uruguay, not by the host government. Any
U.S. representative would have had difficulty gaining the trust of other
delegates as an honest broker. Moreover, rather than offsetting predictable
suspicions, Barshefsky amplified them according to numerous participants.
She made statements that others found arrogant and insulting, one EU
representative said.
52 In one on Thursday, cited by many, she pressured
large working groups to reach agreements, and threatened, “If we are
unable to achieve that goal, I fully reserve the right to also use a more
exclusive process to achieve a final outcome. There is no question about
either my right as the chair to do it or my intention as the chair to do it.
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But it is not the way I want this to be done.”
53 She spent more time
defending firm U.S. distributive positions in press conferences than
privately building consensus—shopping integrative proposals around,
seeking ministers’ ideas, keeping them informed, and cajoling them for
concessions.  She even insisted on performing as the U.S. negotiator in
some sessions, further undermining any image of impartiality she might
have cultivated.
For comparison, a former negotiator from the Uruguay round recalls
an example of how another consensus-builder operated, chairing the group
on dispute settlement and the WTO agreement:
Ambassador Lacarte [of Uruguay] was a great chair. He
listened very carefully.  He went to great lengths to give
everyone a sense of being included.  Then he also called in
each delegation, or spokesman for several delegations, for
what he called “confessionals.”  He also traveled to some
capitals.  Essentially he said, “Trust me.  Show me your
cards.”  I’m not sure how many really did.  But he tried to
test, to feel, to probe for where you had flexibility and where
you really had none.  And once he found something where
you really had no flexibility, he took that on board as
something you were going to have to have. On other issues,
he expected you to sit silently and cooperate when it was
something the other guy had to have.
54
The plan was to set up five ministerial working groups in Seattle, each
group specializing on different outstanding issues, chaired by a different
minister, and supported by a Deputy Director-General, as in past GATT
conferences.  Another problem was that for weeks Washington simply did
not respond to efforts by Geneva officials to recruit the group chairs.
55
They were not all named until the day before the conference. These
potential mediators therefore had to do their best without common
preparation. The Secretariat prepared some potential compromise texts in
case delegations asked for them, but according to one leader, “no one ever
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asked.”
56 Moore was not prepared to be bold, at least not in such a
poisoned atmosphere.
On Thursday afternoon with 24 hours remaining, Barshefsky
decided to commence small green room sessions to work on the remaining
gaps. Some excluded ministers, left in the dark about what was happening
inside, objected vehemently. The Africans, who had spent so much time
preparing and whose leader, Kenya, was not inside, issued a formal
statement saying:
There is no transparency in the proceedings and African
countries are being marginalized and generally excluded on
issues of vital importance for our peoples and their future.
We are particularly concerned over the stated intentions to
produce a ministerial text at any cost including at the cost of
procedures designed to secure participation and consensus.…
We will not be able to join the consensus required to meet the
objectives of this Ministerial Conference.
57
Delegates from Jamaica and Guyana tried to force their way into the green
room. The Dominican Republic’s ambassador, a U.S.-educated economist,
complained: “They still think the WTO is a club.  They still think 20
countries can decide for the rest of us.”
58  Many believed Barshefsky was
determined to force an agenda favorable to U.S. preferences in the small
group and then present a fait accompli to the 135, take it or leave it.
59
Meanwhile, ministers in the larger groups surprisingly were getting
close to agreement on an agenda including at least five issue areas. Their
informal accomplishments, despite all these obstacles, reinforce the
impression that a better yearlong process would have made a significant
difference even given the protestors’ campaign. The services section of the
declaration was virtually finished. Canada’s Agriculture Minister, Lyle
Vanclief, said, “good progress was made on agriculture …  We got down
to millimeters away from a statement on export subsidies that we could all
live with.”
60 Many governments agreed to launch a round including
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industrial tariffs, though India and a few others continued to link this area
to implementation.
61 On transparency in government procurement, India
was the only country that did not join in the consensus.
62
On implementation, Hoda had been hard at work behind the scenes
and by Friday morning had a lengthy, specific text that he believed might
have been accepted if other elements of a package had fallen into place.
63
The collapse meant developing countries lost concrete gains that may have
been close to approval. Little headway was made toward a consensus on
investment, competition policy, environment, or increasing the
transparency of dispute settlement.
64
By late Friday, green room discussion had been consumed by
agriculture and implementation; it had not even reached many other issues.
But talks could not continue into Saturday because Seattle had promised
the building to a convention of optometrists.
65  As a WTO ambassador
recalled, “we were shattered to discover in Seattle that they had not booked
the hall beyond the scheduled deadline for the conference.  In GATT these
things always run over.”
66 In 1986 in Punta del Este agreement had
required six days.  Barshefsky and Moore had allotted only four days,
which was simply too little time for the unusually complex agenda at hand.
Then they lost one of those four to the demonstrators and had not planned
for a time extension. They simply announced the conference was over.
2001 and Doha
This debacle left the organization reeling and looking for ways to rebuild
confidence and legitimacy. The members formally launched the mandated
talks on agriculture and services as well as a discussion of developing
country complaints about implementation of the last round. But 2000 was
dominated by intransigence, frustration and drift, while all awaited the
results of the United States elections. Through the summer of 2001 it
appeared that Doha too could easily end without an agreement to launch a
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new round. But eventually the negotiation process changed in each of these
two key dimensions, in the presence of changes in political conditions.
Strategies
The EU and the US eventually shifted from strictly distributive to mixed
strategies, especially in the final days and hours in Doha, and others
reciprocated.  In this case the negotiators collectively practiced what one
text calls “dovetailing differences.”
67 Negotiators seeking more integrative
outcomes often look for differences, for instance in parties’ preference
orders on different issues, that can be exploited for mutual gain. The
integrative strategy includes offering to grant a concession or fallback on
something one values less if the other will give us a gain on an issue we
value more.
Pascal Lamy, chief negotiator for the European Union, made his
strategy more integrative particularly regarding developing and least
developed countries. Early in 2001 he indicated he could settle for weaker
new rules on investment and competition policy. The EU and an informal
coalition working on competition policy agreed that individual decisions
by competition authorities would not be subject to WTO dispute
settlement, and suggested they might settle for a plurilateral agreement,
one that would not even require signature by all WTO members.
68 A
“Friends of Investment” coalition led by Japan and including the EU
discussed an investment agreement whose principles would not be binding
except for sectors that each government chose to put on a positive list.
69
The EU announced a unilateral concession to try to woo least developed
countries away from blocking coalitions.  Brussels volunteered to cut its
import duties to zero on all exports except arms from least developed
countries. Lamy and his team traveled during the year to several regional
meetings of developing countries to woo them. The EU remained firm on
agriculture and continued to demand major concessions regarding the
environment, especially the recognition of the so-called precautionary
principle that could permit greater restrictions against agricultural imports.
Later in Doha, Lamy made additional compromises.
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US negotiating strategy also became more mixed. Washington still
preferred a new round agenda limited to agriculture, services, and
industrial market access.
70 The new Republican administration dropped
Clinton’s demand to discuss labor rights in the WTO, which made it easier
to split the developing country blocking coalition. In April, USTR Robert
Zoellick met African ministers in Washington and tried to charm them by
opening with a few words in Swahili.
71 In October, recognizing that they
had decided to place heavy weight on the issue of public health and the
TRIPS agreement, Zoellick offered two limited concessions on that issue.
He used the integrative tactic of putting forward a proposal that would
address this concern but in a way less costly to his government and
constituents than the demand on the table.
72  Later in Doha he fell back
further on two issues where there were serious gaps, in exchange for gains
on other issues.
Lamy and Zoellick and their teams also began intensive negotiations
between them after Zoellick had take up his post and before the EU
Gothenburg summit meeting in June. They covered the full range of issues
on the WTO agenda and reached some preliminary agreements.
73
In response to the greater flexibility shown by the two trade
superpowers, most other parties also shifted away from pure value
claiming, giving up on major positions in return for these fallbacks by the
leaders.  Japanese negotiators showed greater flexibility on investment and
competition policy. On agriculture Tokyo continued its firm defensive
claiming strategy to prevent additional liberalization.
74  But when this
proved to be inconsistent with WTO consensus, Japan’s minister gave way
in Doha in exchange for gains on other issues, especially antidumping and
the new issues.
Some developing countries, especially the largest traders, preferred
to launch a new reciprocal liberalizing round and were willing to barter
agenda items to that end. Others continued active in coalitions to claim
value from the industrial countries. Yet by January 2001, according to an
African ambassador to the WTO, “the tone has changed.  Developing
countries have had their ‘mourning period’ on implementation. Now
people are talking about solutions. No one thinks industrialized countries
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will give developing countries more to ‘rebalance’ agreements without
something in exchange.”
75 In the end the weakest players fell back the
most from their initial positions.
Mediation and political management
Second, management and mediation tactics in 2001 were more inclusive
and stronger than in 1999. They kept the spotlight on the common interests
and helped maneuver parties into the eventual tactical shifts just noted.
This year there was no fight over DG selection and a Director General was
in place and more experienced. Mike Moore traveled the world during the
two years after Seattle, meeting personally with more than 300 ministers
and urging them to give their negotiators flexibility. He advocated a
“Development Round” to benefit the poorer members.
In Geneva Moore and Ambassador Stuart Harbinson of Hong Kong-
China, chair of the General Council, continued a process of informal
consultations that had begun to evolve in 2000, one they called a “bottom
up” approach meant to be much more internally transparent and legitimate
than in 1999. Harbinson was an experienced and widely respected civil
servant. He met with many delegations and groups informally to receive
their ideas, test their resistance points, and experiment with ways out of
impasses.  Diplomats in Geneva were reported to believe that “the
prospects for a success in Qatar are pretty much in his hands.”
76 He and
Moore set a deadline of end July for closing at least some gaps.
By then the members were still firmly stalemated. A large group of
least developed countries meeting in Zanzibar declared clearly that they
were not ready for a round including new issues.
77 Moore and Harbinson
held a formal meeting for what Moore called a “reality check.” Harbinson
reported that extensive negotiating effort had not produced proportionate
movement.   “It is not simply the extent of the outstanding differences in
position that is worrying,” he explained, “it is also the apparently
entrenched nature of some of these differences.”
78 Since one common
barrier to agreement is overconfidence by advocates, a common mediation
technique is providing information to correct overly optimistic beliefs. He
reported on which proposals and demands for exceptions were failing to
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achieve consensus as well as the issues where differences seemed to be
narrowing.  Moore warned that "the situation is fragile, and without
generosity, good manners and good will, the process could implode and
become unmanageable.”
79
On 26 September Harbinson, with help from other ambassadors and
the Secretariat, publicly laid on the table an informal single negotiating
text--another relatively strong mediation tactic.
80 Harbinson proposed a
relatively short draft ministerial declaration meant to express a consensus.
To generate support in the next stage it would naturally need to include
gains for many parties, but most of those issues were controversial.
Harbinson’s text was fairly bold in that it deliberately included very few
“square brackets,” or items reflecting a division of views. He did subtract
the implementation issues, where it seemed there might be no agreement
zone, from the main declaration and put them in a separate draft
declaration, to increase the chances of agreement on the rest. Doing so had
distributive implications, of course; it worked against those attempting to
hold the whole hostage in order to leverage gains on implementation.
Otherwise he aimed for compromise language and making the whole seem
balanced.  He stressed that no item had been agreed and that none would
be agreed until all had been settled. But Harbinson and Moore said this
package represented the greatest chance for achieving a political consensus
that year in their judgment.
81
Scholars can recognize this move as an effort to create a focal point.
This means a possible settlement that will be effective in coordinating the
parties’ expectations.  Schelling was thinking of possible outcome points
given by nature, such as a river as a line for separating warring armies that
have decided they prefer to settle but cannot communicate overtly.  But
there is no reason a focal point serving the same function could not be
created, in negotiations that do permit direct communication.  If the regime
mediator’s attempt is to succeed, parties must assess the chair’s text
strategically as well as from their separate standpoints. Each will ask not
only whether our government can work with the text as a basis for final
negotiations, but also would a “better” text “fly” politically? Or would a
change to the text knock another coalition off the consensus? The
mediator’s challenge is to estimate the parties’ true reservation values and
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the likelihood of further persuasion, and then to assemble a formula or
package that parties will judge to be at least a fair basis for further
negotiations, and ideally as “balanced” in this political sense of a stable
equilibrium.  The move fails if parties reject the text as too unfavorable or
imbalanced to be acceptable as a framework.
The informal single text may also be designed to help negotiators
deal with extreme constituents back home in domestic politics during the
next stage.  Geneva consultations showed, for instance, that the US was the
only country resisting the antidumping item.
82 The chair’s text signaled to
Congress that if their agent rejected all deals that included that item (to
satisfy their steel industry), he would block a round that could benefit
many other US sectors, and likewise with other countries.
Recall that at this stage in 1999 the key mediator instead issued a
long compilation of opposed positions full of square brackets, not a single
text.  The Harbinson draft offering some gain to many parties, with his
statement after extensive consultations that this is the best we can do,
created fewer incentives to dig in heels and a much stronger incentive for
negotiators to accept.
In public many negotiators criticized these drafts for departures from
their stated preferences. The package included reform of antidumping
practices despite the clear US rejection, and it excluded all three of the
EU’s demands for negotiations on environmental issues despite strong
domestic pressure for them.  India, Malaysia, Honduras, Tanzania, and
many others complained that the implementation concessions were far
from sufficient to persuade them to accept a new round.  Many complained
about the agriculture language. Moore quipped that the drafts were “a
balance of unhappiness.”
83  But most delegations said they could be a basis
for further talks and privately some said the texts were almost ready to go
to ministers for the tough decisions.
84
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Moore brought together ministers from 22 countries informally prior
to Doha twice—in Mexico City in August and Singapore in October.
Besides including all the most influential ministers, he invited Gabon and
Tanzania, least developed members of the African coalition that had felt so
affronted in Seattle, into the inner circle for the first time.
85   After the
Singapore meeting, ministers reported that a consensus on agriculture was
beginning to emerge, and that developing countries acknowledged that the
EU negotiator would have to get something on the environment in order to
achieve the necessary domestic support. India’s minister was still
disappointed with the small number of unreciprocated concessions on
implementation offered by the developed countries prior to the round.
Privately, however, several delegates reported that India’s coalition
partners were dropping away from its hard line position. One participant
reported that at these informal meetings, negotiators who were divided,
like Zoellick of the US and Takeo Hiranuma of Japan regarding
antidumping, reassured each other that they were sensitive to each other’s
political needs, which increased confidence that a deal could be reached.
86
George Yeo, Singapore’s minister and chair of this meeting, said the
Harbinson draft declarations and this session had brought the WTO 75
percent of the way toward the launch of a new round. “A new Harbinson
text should be able to get us 85 to 90 percent of the way there by Doha.”
 87
One of the most difficult impasses in 2001 proved to concern the
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement and public health. On 4 October a
very large coalition of developing countries--including the African Group,
Brazil, India, and 17 other Latin American and Asian states, proposed that
ministers all declare that “Nothing in the TRIPS agreement shall prevent
members from taking measures to protect public health,” as well as more
detailed language.
88 The impetus came from the AIDS pandemic, pressures
to break patents to get cheaper medicines, and a suit (later dropped) by
pharmaceutical companies against a South African law allowing patented
medicine sold cheaper abroad to be imported without the right holders’
permission. The WTO TRIPS agreement, like many national patent laws,
already provided limited authority for overriding drug patents during a
national emergency. Yet at the companies’ urging, Washington had filed
complaints under this agreement against Thai and Brazilian patent
legislation.  Powerful emotional feelings propelled this campaign, which
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resonated with public opinion. The US, Switzerland, and other developed
countries opposed new language that could permanently enlarge the
loophole to cover more than medicine shortages genuinely due to patent
protection.
89 They offered a declaration that would reaffirm the
agreement’s existing flexibility, and Washington offered least developed
countries an extra ten years (until 2016) to implement TRIPS for
pharmaceuticals. But the coalition was not satisfied.  In October when
Harbinson attempted to produce a single negotiating text on this issue, he
could find no satisfactory compromise.
On 27 October, he published second drafts of his two primary
documents.  Antidumping stayed in despite shouts from the US Congress.
On agriculture he added that the goal of the talks would include
“reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies”--
despite the EU’s firm public rejection.  On controversial new areas—
environment, investment, and competition policy, his text said “work”
would proceed until the next ministerial conference, when decisions would
be taken on modalities of negotiation. He issued a new draft declaration on
TRIPS/health that presented two competing versions of a key paragraph as
alternatives, which at least framed the ensuing debate.
A comparison of the mediator’s October drafts with the decisions
adopted later in Doha reveals how much of the negotiating work had been
completed before the ministers gathered. Nothing had been agreed and
crucial trade-offs on several sensitive issues proved elusive until the final
hours in Doha. Yet when they settled, they settled on declarations whose
language was almost entirely the same as, and whose structures were
identical to, those of Harbinson’s second drafts. A mediator had succeeded
in creating a focal point for the parties, in dramatic contrast with the 1999
process at the same stage.
Conference management
Conference management and mediation tactics in Doha were also much
more favorable for breaking impasses than in Seattle. The choice of Doha
naturally made it difficult for many NGOs to attend and the government
prohibited public demonstrations. The conference chair, Qatar’s Minister
Hussain Kamal, did not use the post to push private goals of any country
nor did he insult other ministers. Unlike Clinton and Barshefsky, Kamal
and Moore made no flagrant interventions that strengthened blocking
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coalitions. Equally important, they allowed more time for the delegates to
do their work. At the scheduled deadline the ministers remained
deadlocked on certain issues, as usual, and this time the chair extended the
meeting.
At the outset the Secretariat named six ministers as “Friends of the
Chair” to take a lead in brokering deals on the most important outstanding
impasses. The six held consultations open to any member state to discuss
implementation, environment, rules such as antidumping, TRIPS/public
health, agriculture, and proposed new issues.
On that first day South Asian and African ministers jointly and
bluntly rejected opening negotiations on investment or competition
policy.
90  For the first two days many delegations defended their
inconsistent positions in case they could claim some additional value.  But
on the last three days under steady prodding by the mediators, first the U.S.
negotiator and then others blended in some integrative tactics and fell back
closer to their true reservation values.
The TRIPS/health issue looked like it might break the entire
conference, according to several participants. This was an issue (unlike
environment and labor standards) on which developing country
governments saw eye to eye with NGO activists.  They worked in parallel,
with groups in Europe and North America raising public awareness of the
African AIDS crisis and drug prices.
91 When the African states rejected the
US attempt to split them off with lesser concessions, Zoellick on the third
day accepted a modified version of their position, over the objections of
his pharmaceutical producers. This compromise was negotiated mainly by
the United States with Brazil, Kenya and Nigeria with mediation assistance
by Mexico.
92 The ministers recognized the gravity of public health
problems affecting many developing countries and reaffirmed that “the
TRIPS agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking
measures to protect public health.”  They spelled out three forms of
flexibility the agreement permits. This declaration did not change legal
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rights or duties under TRIPS, except for the additional ten years before
least developed countries must provide patents on pharmaceuticals. But it
probably encouraged governments to exercise their rights, such as bringing
in low-cost generics in emergencies, and probably signaled that
Washington would now hesitate to file complaints when they do.  It might
also improve poor countries’ leverage when negotiating with multinational
pharmaceutical firms over prices during emergencies. Thus one critical
impasse had been broken, with the US giving developing countries and
health NGOs much but not all of what they had asked for. "Our
expectations were fully met," said Paulo Teixeira, Brazil's top AIDS
official. "Even six months ago, this was unthinkable."
93
Zoellick then dropped another equally significant concession on the
table, agreeing to accept antidumping on the agenda, despite two
congressional resolutions warning him not to sacrifice US trade remedy
laws.  For months the united front of Japan, Korea and many developing
countries had made it seem highly likely that there would be no round
without this agenda item.
In the end critical impasses were broken in small informal
meetings,
94 but this time the smallest, least developed traders had
representatives on the inside. On the fourth and last day, at a “green room”
meeting six of the ministers present were from Africa.  They refused to
accept the emerging deal unless they were satisfied on two issues. They
insisted on adequate technical assistance from developed countries to
enable them to understand the technicalities and participate realistically in
the coming negotiations. And the 56 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
States insisted on approval of a WTO waiver for a new preferential pact
between them and the European Union.
95  This issue was not part of the
ministerial declaration, but a group of Latin Americans, the Philippines,
and Thailand were blocking this waiver.  The ACP got their waiver as a
side payment as well as the promise of assistance.
96
Also on the last day Japan, South Korea and Norway indicated they
would reluctantly accept the Harbinson language on agriculture. This left
the EU alone in opposition to the pledge to phase out export subsidies.
97 In
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a green room session beginning at the conference deadline, midnight on
November 13/14, Lamy said he could not sell this package in Europe
unless he received at least something on two issues—environment and
investment.  Zoellick and Hiranuma of Japan supported adding both to the
text.
 98 At 3:00 am Wednesday Lamy and Franz Fischler, the commissioner
for agriculture, reluctantly accept the Harbinson language that committed
the Community for the first time to the goal of completely phasing out
agricultural export subsidies (with no date specified), despite French
threats to walk out.
99
Little of substance had been conceded on implementation, and
India’s Murasoli Maran and a few other ministers still threatened to block
consensus.
100 This time Moore decided to call their bluff, adjourned the
green room, and scheduled a plenary session for final decisions on the
texts as they stood. In Seattle, Moore and Barshefsky had allowed green
room discussions to continue until all the time remaining for a plenary had
been exhausted.
101  The package included the three documents—the main
declaration, a second mostly symbolic declaration taking note of
implementation concerns, and the public health/TRIPS declaration.
Maran remained firm, however, even after British Prime Minister
Blair had called Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to plead for flexibility.
Secretariat leaders now feared “we were sunk; everything had been
tried.”
102 But after the final plenary meeting had already begun, Moore
took Maran aside and secured his conditional assent. The conference chair
read a statement of his understanding that the agreed text meant that any
state could block the launching of talks on the new issues at the next
ministerial conference. This interpretive statement was not included in the
text put to ministers but added an ambiguity that allowed both sides to
report victories to their parliaments.  Some ministers had also said they
could not agree to anything called a “round” because they had pledged to
prevent such an outcome.
103 For this reason the program was instead
labeled the “Doha Development Agenda.”  The full conference approved
the package with no dissent 20 hours after its deadline.
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In doing so, many least developed members had swallowed
negotiations they said was premature and that partially opened the door to
the new issues--environment, competition policy, and investment—
although they limited the degree to which they intruded further on
domestic regulation.  These members achieved almost no unilateral gains
regarding the implementation of the last round. In fact, the US and Canada
insisted on deleting a gain on textiles that Harbinson had included in his
draft.
104 The poor could achieve new gains only by offering new
concessions in future talks.  Other members were also frustrated in part.
The agenda excluded labor standards, the precautionary principle, WTO
governance, and other proposed issues.
Nevertheless, no state decided in the end to block the consensus this
time. Developing countries were able to show their parliaments some
winnings. For the African ministers, the health declaration, the ACP
waiver, and the promises of assistance were valued the most highly,
according to the ACP Secretariat.
105 For larger traders in the South, the
agenda items on agricultural subsidies, antidumping and industrial market
access were important.  Developing countries had evidently made credible
their threats to block consensus without some concessions. The formation
of coalitions made these threats more credible than if they had acted
separately. No ministers departed denouncing the WTO or its negotiating
process as illegitimate this time. Rather, Nigeria’s Trade Minister Mustafa
Bello concluded, “Unlike in Seattle, Africa has been satisfied with all the
stages in consultations and negotiation processes in Doha.”
106
Thus it appeared that either some of the earlier demands had been
tactical padding to be traded away for gains, or the process including the
mediators had changed early optimism that other players could be forced
to yield more. Actual reservation values at the end appear to have been
well below what negotiators said they were. The same might have been
true in 1999, by the way. Many ministers might have been willing to fall
back substantially at the last moment then too in exchange for gains, if the
year-long process had settled most of the complex issues before Seattle,
and if conference management had not thrown so many obstacles in the
way of consensus building.
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The particular mix of agenda items and trade-offs packaged together
in Doha would be impossible to explain without tracing the negotiation
process that led to this combination rather than another. The process
explains, for example, why the agenda included one of two items the
Americans swore they could not stomach—the antidumping rules—but not
the other--the textiles rules. The coalition pressing for the former was
much larger, it included Japan, Korea, and the EU, and its threat to block
was therefore more credible. Why did the package include contradictory
decisions both to negotiate on four new behind-the-border issues and also
not to negotiate on them unless a decision is made by consensus at a later
meeting? The EU wanted immediate negotiations, a large group wanted no
negotiations, and in classic fashion they settled on an ambiguous way to
paper over differences so they did not lose gains achieved elsewhere in the
package. Why did the ministers give the EU a limited agenda item on
environment, even though most members had opposed it for years and
Harbinson had excluded it? At three o’clock in the morning after the
deadline, Lamy told the green room that he could not join the consensus
without it. The chair added the item at the very last minute and presented
the package to the last plenary as take-it-or-leave-it. Why did the package
deliver so little immediate value on implementation and allow an opening
to the new issues, even though the demandeurs had the authority to block if
not satisfied? They decided to trade their support for other concessions.
Why did the African-Caribbean coalition insist on a side payment—the
waiver for their EU preferential arrangement--that would have no value
after 4 years, rather than insisting on completely excluding unwelcome
new rules that would affect them indefinitely? Other parties were more
likely to concede the former. The process thus explains why the package
deal included several items that are not part of the future negotiating
agenda: a political declaration concerning the TRIPS agreement, a waiver
decision for the African, Caribbean and Pacific states, and much of the
declaration on implementation issues.
Difficult as it was to attain, this agreement only created an agenda
for future negotiations. The relieved delegates were fully aware that they
faced more tough bargaining over each of these issues, buffeted by
entrenched special interests just as these talks were.                                                                                                                                                             34
The Batna Seemed Worse
The more favorable mediation and management tactics probably were not
the only reasons for the members’ strategy shifts. There is evidence that
many government negotiators also perceived that their best alternative to a
WTO agreement (the “batna”) had worsened, which could have also
lowered their true minima somewhat from 1999. A basic principle of
negotiation analysis is that an improving alternative outside the talks will
shift a negotiator’s resistance point upward and harden his or her
distributive tactics inside the talks, and vice versa.
107 Probably most potent
was a shared fear, expressed privately by numerous participants, that given
Seattle, a repeat performance could be devastating for the WTO as an
institution. A second impasse could have encouraged legislators and
governments to reach for protectionism and discriminatory regional or
bilateral deals that would unravel the hard-won accomplishments of the
past.
108 Imperfect though the WTO may have been, small powers in
particular might suffer even more under the law of the jungle.  On the first
day in Doha Kenyan Minister and Africa spokesman Nicholas Biwott said
publicly, “We don't want to see a repeat of the Seattle failure. . . We're here
to negotiate and there's always room for compromise.”
109
Some have speculated that the violent September 11 attacks in the
United States added a second exogenous change in the political
environment that worked in favor of agreement in Doha. The leading
advocates of a new round certainly leaped at the opportunity to argue that
the fragility of the world economy and the threat of terrorism were
additional reasons for governments to demonstrate solidarity through trade
liberalization. This was a tactic to convince reluctant ministers that
September 11 had further worsened their batna. The argument may have
convinced some.  On 22 October the Financial Times reported:
Enthusiasm for a trade round has grown in many national
capitals since September 11 because it is one of the few policy
initiatives available to steady nervous markets, restore
business confidence, and lay the basis for resumed growth. [A
new round] would take several years to conclude and longer
still to deliver tangible benefits. Right now, however,
launching one is increasingly considered essential for
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symbolic and psychological reasons as much as for economic
ones. Doing so would send a powerful political signal of
countries’ determination to make common cause in the face of
adversity.
110
The argument may have been largely bogus; it is difficult to see how
agreement on a WTO negotiating agenda could have made much tangible
economic difference in the short term.  It is not clear that any theory based
on material interests would have predicted concessions on these grounds.
Yet one WTO ambassador from Africa, who had been working to head off
the new issues and who was present in Doha, said some disappointed
African ministers had been intimidated by this argument that blocking this
ambitious round would jeopardize the entire world economy and the battle
against terrorism.
111
The September attacks also added a tangible obstacle to agreement
in Doha.  The meeting was almost moved or canceled because the sudden
war in southwest Asia made many trade diplomats quite apprehensive
about traveling to Qatar.  The WTO’s entire staff of interpreters refused to
go, and reportedly the US delegation itself agreed to attend only at the last
possible moment.
112  If governments did reduce their subjective reservation
values after Seattle, the main reason probably was fears for the credibility
of the WTO as a trade institution if they failed a second time.
Conclusions
In sum, two major differences between these two cases seem to have made
a decisive difference in producing the contrasting outcomes. Exogenous
political changes lowered members’ fuzzy reservation values and
conceivably widened a zone of agreement, and a different process removed
major obstacles to agreement and influenced how those reservation values
were perceived as well, tipping the parties the other way.   Behaving
differently in the second case, the same states with essentially the same
commercial interests but different negotiation and mediation tactics
managed to dovetail some differences and break their impasse.
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Attempting to explain this difference and the terms of the package
deal by ignoring the negotiation process would miss much of the answer.
The national interests of 1999 alone probably were not sufficient to insure
an impasse that year, and the exogenous changes alone probably would not
have been enough to produce agreement in 2001. In 1999 had WTO
negotiators and mediators employed a process--all year--like the one they
followed in 2001 and all else had been the same, they probably would have
reached some agreement to launch some new round in Seattle, even with
street protests, and they would have done much less damage to their
institution’s legitimacy.  Even as it was, the ministers came remarkably
close to agreement on five key issues. If in addition the largest traders had
led with more mixed, flexible strategies as they did two years later, and if
the Geneva preparations had been more chair-driven, more negotiating
gains would have seemed within reach before Seattle, making it more
costly for all to sit firmly on uncompromising positions. By the same
token, had the players repeated the actual 1999 process two years later—if
the 2001 preparations had been proposal-driven and the chair had not
offered a true single negotiating text, if leaders had excluded the least
developed from the critical small meetings and demanded that they accept
an agenda designed by the Quad, and if the 2001 conference had been
blocked by thousands of US steelworkers, chaired by the United States,
and forced to disband promptly the announced deadline, it too almost
certainly would have ended in impasse.
Rival interpretations are always conceivable and no two cases are
sufficient to prove any generalization, or to establish causality even for
those two cases with airtight certainty. And this regime continues to evolve
after the Doha conference. But the WTO is one of the strongest
intergovernmental institutions in the world.  If the process makes a
significant difference here, is it not highly likely to make an even greater
difference in institutions whose rules constrain their members less? This
sharp contrast suggests several hypotheses that, if developed more
precisely, would be worth testing in a larger set of cases.
1.  In any negotiation, the better the outside alternative to a
negotiated agreement is perceived to be, the higher the negotiator’s
reservation value and the harder his claiming tactics will be, and
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2.  In any regime negotiation, the more the parties depart from strict
value-claiming strategies in favor of mixed or value-creating
strategies, the higher the odds of breaking impasses and changing
the regime.
3.  In any regime negotiation, if a legitimate mediator introduces a
single negotiating text that contains gains for many parties and
suggests compromise language for controversies—creating an
authoritative focal point--the odds of breaking impasses and
changing the regime will be higher than otherwise.
4.  In any regime negotiation governed by the consensus rule, small
players will enhance the credibility of their threat to block
agreement if they form coalitions and speak with one voice than if
some do so without coordination, and hence will shift the outcome’s
terms in their favor.
5.  In the WTO and probably other regime negotiations, if the
conference chair excludes small states from informal small meetings
where deals are made, the odds of agreement and the regime’s
legitimacy will be reduced.
These hypotheses have not been presented and tested against much
evidence in regime studies.  Additional research on the negotiation process
in the WTO and other regimes, framed by a theory comprehending the
whole process, would help sharpen these ideas and perhaps identify
conditions necessary for them to operate. Comparisons across regimes and
across time would help isolate how institutional variation shapes the
process. Analogous studies of the negotiation and mediation strategies
deployed in other regimes would greatly enrich our understanding of how
they too evolve over time or fail to do so. Such a research program would
generate additional answers to the unanswered questions outlined in
section one. The answers also have obvious practical implications for
future negotiators, organization leaders, and indirectly the citizens who are
affected by their impasses and agreements.                                                                                                                                                             38
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